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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant's statement of jurisdiction is incorrect, as the appeal was improperly
initiated in the Utah Supreme Court. The case was presumably transferred to this Court
pursuant to Rule 44, Utah R. App. P., governing improperly pursued appeals. In any event,
because this is an appeal from the district court involving domestic relations, the Utah Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(i).1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant attempts to raise three issues on appeal; however, he argued only
the second issue in the district court. The issues raised are as follows:
1. Whether there are material issues of fact precluding summary judgment?
(a) This issue was not preserved in the district court. Plaintiff did not argue that
summary judgment was precluded by the existence of material issues of fact. (R. 259.) In
fact, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and argued that summary judgment
was appropriate. (R. 230, 251-52.)
(b) If addressed, the district court's conclusion that there are no material issues of
fact is reviewed for correctness. Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell,
824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992).
2. Whether it was impossible for plaintiff timely to register his paternity through no
fault of his own?
(a) This is the only issue specifically argued by plaintiff and decided in the district
court. (R. 254, 288.)

On a related matter, the designation of case priority on the cover of Appellant's Brief is also incorrect.
The priority is not category 2, pertaining to criminal convictions, but category 4, which includes appeals from
orders concerning child custody or termination of parental rights. Rules 27(c) and 29(b), Utah R. App. P.

(b) The district court's ruling that timely registration was not impossible is reviewed
for correctness. In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah App. 1995).
3. Whether requiring plaintiff to register a claim of paternity violates his due process
rights.2
(a) Plaintiff did not argue the due process issue in the district court. Due process is
not mentioned in the verified complaint, and it is mentioned only in passing, without analysis
or authority, in plaintiffs summary judgment memorandum. (R. 21, 252.)
(b) If addressed, the due process issue is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah App. 1995).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
This appeal is governed by the paternity registration statute, U.C.A. § 78-30-4.8 (1994
Supp.), which is set forth verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 43.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by an unwed father to obtain custody of a child relinquished and
placed for adoption on November 17, 1994. Plaintiff initially filed a paternity action in
California, but subsequently filed this action in Utah. The district court in this case ruled
that Utah had exclusive jurisdiction of the issues, and the parties stipulated to dismissal of
the California action. (R. 171, 174-75.) The district court subsequently granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment.
(R. 285-88.) Plaintiff filed this appeal from the order of summary judgment. (R. 292.)

2

Plaintiff also mixes into this issue the question whether the district court misread In re Adoption of W,
904 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995), as binding precedent. However, the holding in Adoption ofW\s not the
issue, but the legal basis for deciding the issue. The district court had no choice but to follow that precedent.

2

The Utah Supreme Court entered a conditional Order of Dismissal for failure to file
a docketing statement, but subsequently transferred the case to this Court. (Add. 6.) This
Court issued a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition on the basis that the case was
being considered for summary affirmance under the authority of In re Adoption of W, 904
P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995). (Add. 7.) However, the Court later decided to defer decision
of the issues until plenary presentation and consideration of the case. (Add. 8.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Mario G. Beltran, and defendant Denise Allan, both age 20 when this action
began, are single individuals who have never been married. They were residing with their
respective parents in the State of California when they began dating in 1993. In March of
1994, Denise informed plaintiff that she was pregnant by him and that the baby was due in
November 1994. (Verified Complaint, 11U 1-2, 6, R. 20-21; Affidavit of Denise Allan, IfU 2-3,
R. 212, Add. 10; Deposition of Mario G. Beltran, 3-4, 9-12, 17, 51; Affidavit of Mario G.
Beltran, UH 2-4, R. 233-34.)
In approximately May of 1994, plaintiff and Denise ceased dating, and Denise
informed plaintiff that she had decided to place the baby for adoption. Plaintiff expressed
opposition to the adoption, but he believed that Denise would proceed with the adoption
anyway. Thereafter, Denise never told plaintiff that she would not place the baby for
adoption, and plaintiff understood the continuing possibility of adoption. In approximately
June 1994, Denise contacted LDS Social Services ("Agency") regarding placing her baby for
adoption in Utah.

Denise subsequently requested plaintiff to complete background

3

information forms related to the adoption, and plaintiff complied. (Allan Afft, UU 4-5, R.
211-12, Add. 10; Beltran Dep. 20-31, 38, 69-72; Beltran Afft, UU 5-8, R. 233.)3
Around mid-August 1994, Denise left California to reside with her aunt in Provo,
Utah, where she planned to complete her pregnancy and place the baby for adoption. Prior
to leaving California, Denise informed plaintiff that she was going to Utah to complete the
pregnancy and place the baby for adoption. Plaintiff responded by accusing Denise that she
was leaving out of selfishness and embarrassment to be carrying his baby. Upon arriving in
Utah, Denise contacted the Agency's Provo office to complete arrangements for the
adoption. (Allan Afft, HU 6-7, R. 211, Add. 11; Affidavit of Beverly R. Bekker, H 2, R. 188,
Add. 34; Beltran Dep. 53-56.)4
Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition that, following his conversation with Denise in May 1994, he
believed she would carry out the adoption:
Q: So she told you over the phone that she was going-that she had decided to place the
baby for adoption?
A: Yes.
Q: What was your response?
A: Told her no.
Q: So when that conversation ended you believed that she was going to place the baby for
adoption?
A: Yes. After that conversation, after that conversation, yes. [Beltran Dep. 23.]
4

Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that Denise informed him, before she left, that she was going to Utah
and would return to California after placing the baby for adoption:
Q: Before she came to Utah did she ever tell you that she would move back to California
as soon as the child had been placed for adoption?
A: Yes, yeah. [Beltran Dep. 54.]
Q: . . . Did she ever tell you that she was planning to move back to California after the
adoption?
A: Yes.
Q: When did she tell you that?
A: I don't recall. I don't know when she told me that.
Q: Well, if she told you she was coming back to California right after the adoption, it had
to have been before she left didn't it?

4

While in Utah during the pregnancy, Denise communicated by telephone and letters
with plaintiff and his mother regarding the planned adoption. In one phone conversation
with plaintiff around the first of October 1994, Denise reaffirmed her adoption plan to
plaintiff. In response to one of her letters, Denise received a letter from plaintiffs mother,
dated October 17, 1994, expressing her "mixed feelings" regarding the proposed adoption.
(Allan Afft, U 8, R. 211, Add. 11; Beltran Dep. 38-39, 67-71.)
On October 26, 1994, plaintiff filed a paternity action in California, alleging that he
was the father of Denise's unborn child, and that Denise had moved to Utah to release the
child for adoption. Plaintiff mailed a copy of the California paternity complaint to Denise
and the Agency at their Provo, Utah addresses. Upon receiving the complaint, Denise called
plaintiff by phone and expressed her surprise and disappointment at his effort to block the
adoption. Denise reaffirmed her adoption decision and told plaintiff that she had selected
an adoptive family and was proceeding with the adoption. Following this conversation,
plaintiff knew that Denise would proceed with the adoption. (Allan Afft, UU 9-10, R.
210-11, Add. 11-12; Bekker Afft, H 4, R. 188, Add. 34; Beltran Afft, HH 13-15, R. 232;
Beltran Dep. 48-54, 69-71.)5
A: I suppose, yes.
Q: So she told you before she left that she would come right back after the adoption?
Mr. Moody: If you have a recollection.
The Witness: Yes.
Q: (By Mr. Nelson) She did tell you that before she left?
A: Yes. [Beltran Dep. 55-56.]

Regarding the telephone conversation with Denise after commencement of the California action, plaintiff
testified:
Q: Did she say she would not go ahead with the adoption?
A: No, she didn't say that.

5

In a letter to plaintiff dated October 27,1994, the Agency confirmed that Denise was
in Utah and that she intended to place the baby for adoption.

Plaintiff subsequently

consulted with three different California attorneys to stop the adoption, but they each
explained that they could not help because they did not know Utah law. Despite knowing
of the need to contact a Utah attorney, plaintiff failed to do so until around the end of
November 1994, two weeks after the birth and placement. (Bekker Afft, U 3, R. 188,
Add. 34; Beltran Afft, H 16, R. 231; Beltran Dep. 40-46, 79-80.)6
Q: So as far as you knew after that conversation she was still going ahead with the adoption?
A: Yes. [Beltran Dep. 71.]
6

Regarding his contact with California attorneys following receipt of the October 27 letter, plaintiff
testified:
Q: So you received the letter from Social Sevices saying that Denise was going ahead with
the adoption and you wanted to take action to stop the adoption?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you contact an attorney?
A: Not at this time. We had talked to a few down in California.
Q: A few days after you received that [letter] you talked to an attorney?
A: Yes. And they didn't know the laws over in Utah.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Did you talk to just one?
No, we talked to three.
Three different attorneys?
Yes.

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Did you retain any of them to help you?
No.
Why?
They didn't know the laws of Utah. . . . [Beltran Dep. 44-45.]

Plaintiff also repeatedly asserts that, after receiving the October 27 notice from the Agency, he
telephoned Beverly Bekker, the Agency representative, and that she hung up on him. However, in his
deposition, plaintiff admitted that he never telephoned Beverly Bekker or anyone else at the Agency:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Did you ever talk on the phone with Beverly Bekker?
No.
You never did?
No.
Did you ever talk on the phone with anyone from LDS Social Services in Utah?

6

On November 14, 1994, Denise gave birth to a baby girl in a Utah County hospital.
On November 17, 1994, Denise signed a Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption,
transferring custody of the baby to the Agency, and the Agency placed the baby with the
Adoptive Parents that same day. Upon returning to California the following week, Denise
informed plaintiff that she had placed the child for adoption in Utah. The Agency confirmed
the adoptive placement in a December 1994 letter responding to plaintiffs request for
information. (Allan Afft, 1JU H-13, R. 210, Add. 12; Bekker Afft, UH 5-7, R. 187-88,
Add. 34-35; Beltran Afft, 1JU 17-18, R. 231; Beltran Dep. 76-79; Verified Complaint, H 11,
Exh. R, R. 1.) 7
Plaintiff failed to register a claim of paternity with the Utah Department of Health
prior to relinquishment of the child for adoption; in fact, plaintiff has never registered a claim
of paternity with regard to Denise's baby in the State of Utah. (Bekker Afft, U 8, R. 187,
Add. 35; Order, R. 287, Add. 2; Beltran Dep. 81.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on January 11,1995, seeking custody of the child and
damages. (R. 21.) Plaintiff subsequently stipulated to dismissal of his California paternity
action. (R. 175.) On November 30, 1995, the district court granted defendants summary

A: No. [Beltran Dep. 63.]
7

Regarding his knowledge of the adoption, plaintiff testified:
Q: When did you learn the baby was placed for adoption?
A: Once Denise-Fm not positive, I think it's when Denise got back she told me.
Q: Now, that conversation with Denise was about, you said, about five days after the birth
of the baby?
A: Yes.
Q: So that would have been in November when you learned that it had been placed?
A: Yes. [Beltran Dep. 79.]

7

judgment in this case based on plaintiffs failure to comply with the Utah paternity
registration statute, as construed and upheld by this Court in In re Adoption of W, 904 P.2d
1113 (Utah App. 1995). (R. 287-88, Add. 1.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is an appropriate case for summary judgment, and plaintiff failed to argue to the
contrary in the district court. Plaintiff has cited no material issue of fact. Any supposed
dispute as to what was done or understood prior to October 1994 is rendered immaterial by
plaintiffs own admission at that time that he knew Denise was in Utah placing the child for
adoption. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, given plaintiffs
knowledge in October 1994, plaintiff could have registered his paternity by November 17,
1994, but failed to register at all.
Plaintiff concedes that he failed to register his paternity prior to Denise's
relinquishment, as required by the registration statute.

Moreover, the "impossibility

exception" to timely registration cannot apply in this case because (1) it was possible for
plaintiff to register prior to the relinquishment; (2) plaintiffs failure to register by that
deadline was due to his own fault in failing to ascertain the Utah registration requirement;
and (3) plaintiff, having failed to register at all, plainly failed to register within 10 days after
it became possible. Utah law is clear that an unwed father must strictly comply with the
statutory requirements to assert his paternal rights. Prior cases applying the impossibility
exception are distinguishable from this case because plaintiff knew, at least 23 days before
the relinquishment, that Denise was in Utah with the intent of placing the child for adoption.
Furthermore, plaintiff is not entitled to a hearing on compliance with the registration statute,

8

because there is no evidence that it was impossible for him to register timely through no fault
of his own.
Plaintiff failed to argue the due process issue in the district court. In any event, in
Adoption of W this Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the registration statute and held
that the 10-day rule satisfies due process. Moreover, the 10-day rule is fair and reasonable
as applied in this case because plaintiff never registered, and if he had registered within 10
days after it became possible, he could have contested the adoption. Because plaintiff failed
to register, he is barred from contesting the adoption or asserting any interest in the child.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: PLAINTIFF HAS CITED NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT PRECLUDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Plaintiff argues that there are material issues of fact precluding entry of summary
judgment. (App. Br. 12-13.) However, plaintiff fails to cite even one such disputed fact.
Moreover, plaintiff failed to make this argument in the district court and is, therefore, barred
from raising it on appeal. E.g., James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987).
In the district court, without arguing against summary judgment, plaintiff listed four
supposedly "disputed material facts:" (1) whether plaintiff believed in May 1994 that Denise
would place the baby for adoption; (2) whether the background information provided by
plaintiff pertained to adoption; (3) whether Denise communicated with plaintiff by telephone
from Utah; and (4) whether the Agency's October 27, 1994 letter "reaffirmed" that Denise
was in Utah. (R. 258-59.) Again, plaintiff did not argue that those claimed disputes
precluded summary judgment. Moreover, as defendants demonstrated in reply, none of those
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four claimed disputes is material to the sole legal issue of whether timely registration of
paternity was impossible, through no fault of plaintiff. (R. 274-78.)
Plaintiff does not dispute the essential material facts in this case. He does not dispute
that he learned of the pregnancy in May 1994; he knew of the planned adoption throughout
the pregnancy; and he knew by at least the middle of October 1994, one month before the
relinquishment, that Denise was in Provo, Utah. With that information, plaintiff could have
contested the adoption by merely registering a claim of paternity in Utah prior to November
17, 1994. Accordingly, any claimed dispute regarding what plaintiff believed in May 1994,
or the purpose of the adoption papers in July 1994, or whether Denise informed plaintiff she
was going to Utah in August 1994, or whether the two communicated by telephone thereafter
is completely immaterial. All such facts are rendered immaterial by plaintiffs own admission
in his October 25 California complaint that Denise "has moved to Utah and plans to release
the child for adoption" (R. 125, emp. added.) With that information on October 25, if not
earlier, plaintiff certainly could have registered a claim of paternity in Utah by November 17.
Thus, plaintiffs own admission confirms the only material facts in this case.
In summary, there is no factual dispute regarding plaintiffs ability to register a timely
claim of paternity.
POINT II:

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SATISFYTHE IMPOSSIBILITY EXCEPTION TO
TIMELY REGISTRATION OF PATERNITY.

A. Paternity Registration Requirement.
The adoption statute in effect when this case arose provides that an unwed father may
claim paternal rights in his newborn child only by timely registering a claim of paternity.
Section 78-30-4.8(l)(a), Utah Code Ann. (1994 Supp.), states:
10

Any person who is the father or claims to be the father of a child born
outside of marriage may file notice of his claim of paternity and of his
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability with the
state registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health. [Add. 43.]
To be timely, the father's paternity registration must be filed before the child is
relinquished for adoption. Section 78-30-4.8(2) provides:
The notice may be filed prior to the birth of the child but must be filed
prior to the time the child is relinquished to a licensed child placing
agency . . . . [Id., emp. added.]
Because of the vital importance of determining with promptness and finality the
long-term care of the child, a father who fails to register timely is barred from filing any
action to assert any interest in the child. As set forth in section 78-30-4.8(3):
The Legislature finds that a certain degree of finality is necessary in order
to facilitate the state's interest in expediting the adoption of young children
and in protecting the rights and interests of the child, the birth mother, and
the adoptive parents. Therefore, any putative father who fails to file his notice
of paternity is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert
any interest in the child . . . . [Id., emp. added.]
Furthermore, subsection (4) makes clear that a father who fails to register his
paternity has no rights in relation to the adoption of the child:
[F]ailure to file a notice of paternity shall be deemed to be a waiver and
surrender of any right to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for
adoption of the child, and the consent of that person to the adoption of the child
is not required. [Id., emp. added.]
In accordance with these statutes, an unwed father who fails to register his claim of
paternity prior to the child's relinquishment for adoption forfeits all paternal rights to the
child, is barred from filing any action to assert any interest in the child, and has no right to
contest the adoption of the child. See In re Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah App.
1995) (father who fails to register pursuant to section 78-30-4.8 "is explicitly barred from
11

objecting to the adoption petition"); Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d 637, 640 (Utah
1990) (rights of unwed father are "automatically terminated" upon mother's adoptive
relinquishment); Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 202 (Utah 1984) (father's rights
are "surrendered pursuant to statute" by failure to register timely claim of paternity); Sanchez
v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984) (a firm cutoff date for registration
is essential, and the father's diligence and sincerity short of timely registration are
unavailing).8
Plaintiff concedes that he failed to comply with the foregoing registration requirement.
(App. Br. 15.) Plaintiff not only failed to register a claim of paternity prior to Denise's
relinquishment, he has never registered a claim of paternity. Therefore, plaintiff has forfeited
his paternal rights, and this action is barred. In re Adoption of W, supra, 904 P.2d at 1120.
B. Impossibility Exception.
Plaintiff argues that he is exempt from the registration requirement by the terms of
the statutory impossibility exception. (App. Br. 15.) However, the district court correctly
ruled that plaintiff failed to satisfy the conditions of that exception.
The so-called "impossibility exception" authorizes the court to recognize a late
paternity registration if the father proves by "clear and convincing evidence" that it was

The current adoption statute, effective May 1,1995, contains a similar paternity registration scheme. The
unwed father of a newborn child can establish his paternal rights by filing with the Department of Health a
notice of commencement of a paternity action prior to the mother's relinquishment of the child for adoption.
U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (1995 Supp.). A father who fails to comply with the statute "is deemed to have
waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child . . . and his consent to the adoption of the child is
not required." Id., subsection (5). Accordingly, the legislative intent to require timely and definitive action
by unwed fathers remains unchanged.
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impossible for him to register timely through no fault of his own. Specifically, as set forth
in 78-30-4.8(3), the unwed father must establish the following three conditions:
(a) it was not possible for him to file a notice of paternity within the period
of time specified in Subsection (2);
(b) his failure to file a notice of paternity was through no fault of his own;
and
(c) he filed a notice of paternity within 10 days after it became possible for
him to file. [Id., Add. 43.]
This Court traced the legislative history and provided the correct interpretation of the
impossibility exception in the recent case of In re Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah App.
1995). There, the unwed parents were Indiana residents, but the mother went to Nevada one
month before the birth without notifying the father. The mother's family refused to disclose
her location to the father. The mother gave birth in Nevada and relinquished the child to
an agency for adoptive placement in Utah. Unaware of the mother's location or of the
child's birth, the father commenced a paternity action in Indiana on the day after the birth.
Two weeks later, the mother notified the father of the birth and pending Utah adoption.
However, the father failed to register a claim of paternity in Utah until eight months later.
Instead, his attorneys notified the adoptive parents of his opposition to adoption and filed
an objection in the adoption proceeding. This Court held that the father's failure to register
timely barred him from objecting to the adoption. Id. at 1120. Moreover, the Court rejected
the argument of substantial compliance with the statute, observing that precise adherence to
statutory requirements is mandated by both policy and precedent. Id. at 1121. Finally, the
Court held that the impossibility exception did not apply because, even if timely registration
was impossible through no fault of the father, he still failed to register within ten days after
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it became possible, based on the mother's notice of the Utah adoption.

The Court

concluded:
As a result of this failure to timely file his notice, [the father] forfeited the
benefits of the statute. [Id.]
Based on the analysis and holding in Adoption of W, it is evident that the three
conditions for the impossibility exception are not satisfied in this case.
1.

Impossibility.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence, clear and convincing or

otherwise, demonstrating that timely registration of paternity was impossible. Plaintiff argues
that timely registration was impossible because Denise left California without advising him
and gave birth in Utah. (App. Br. 21.) As noted in the Statement of Facts, Denise maintains
that she did inform plaintiff of her departure in August 1994, and plaintiff admitted in his
deposition that he was informed prior to her departure.

The record also shows

correspondence between Denise and plaintiffs family in early October 1994, indicating that
plaintiff knew Denise's Utah address. However, even if plaintiff was not informed of
Denise's departure in August 1994, his own California complaint, signed October 25,
concedes that he knew Denise had "moved to Utah and plans to release the child for
adoption." (Add. 25.) Moreover, plaintiff mailed that complaint to Denise at her Provo,
Utah address. Therefore, plaintiff admittedly knew Denise's location and intent at least 23
days before she relinquished the child on November 17. Because plaintiff learned of Denise's
location and intent within sufficient time to register in Utah, her supposed departure without
notice did not render timely registration impossible. In re Adoption ofW, supra, 904 P.2d at
1120-21; Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 207-08 (Utah 1984) (timely registration
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was not impossible because the father had "ample advance notice of the expected time of
birth and the fact that the mother intended to relinquish the child for adoption").
Plaintiff next argues that timely registration was impossible because no one advised
him of the paternity registration requirement. (App. Br. 21.) However, the law does not
require actual notice of the statutory requirements for establishing paternal rights. Sanchez
v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, 680 P.2d at 755. The only notice that is required to an
out-of-state father is that the child is to be born in Utah and could be placed for adoption.
Ellis v. Social Services Dept, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980); In re Adoption of Baby Boy
Doe, 111 P.2d 686, 690-91 (Utah 1986). Plaintiff admittedly knew that the child was to be
born in Utah and that Denise planned to place the child for adoption. With that knowledge,
the burden is on the father to learn of the Utah legal requirements to protect his rights. In
re Adoption ofW, supra, 904 P.2d at 1121 (nonresident father must "strictly comply" with Utah
law). Plaintiff contacted three different California attorneys who informed him that he
needed a Utah attorney. Yet, plaintiff apparently ignored that advice and proceeded with
a California action. However, filing a paternity action in the father's home state does not
satisfy the Utah registration requirement. In re Adoption of W, supra, at 1115, 1120-21
(father's Indiana paternity action held unavailing under Utah law). Thus, plaintiff cannot
create impossibility by choosing to remain ignorant of Utah legal requirements.
Finally, plaintiff claims that timely registration was impossible because he was not
notified of the child's birth and relinquishment until the end of November 1994. (App. Br.
22.) However, occurrence of the birth is not necessary for timely registration. As set forth
in section 78-30-4.8(2), the father's claim of paternity "may be filed prior to the birth of the
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child." (Emp. added.) The father is not required to wait for the birth. Moreover, if he waits
for notice of the relinquishment, he is too late in any event. Id. Here, plaintiff had advance
notice of the expected birth and planned adoption with sufficient time to register his
paternity. Therefore, plaintiffs ignorance of the actual birth and relinquishment did not
render timely registration impossible.
In summary, timely registration was not impossible.
2. Plaintiffs Fault Neither can plaintiff show that his failure to register prior to the
relinquishment was through no fault of his own. Plaintiff argues that, upon learning of the
impending Utah adoption, he "did everything he thought necessary to preserve and protect
his rights." (App. Br. 23.) Plaintiff refers to his California paternity action, this subsequent
Utah action, and his "manifested" intent to keep the baby. (Id.) However, while plaintiff
may have done what he thought was necessary, he did not do what was required by law.
Plaintiffs actions do not satisfy the Utah registration statute. In Adoption ofW, supra,
the Indiana father commenced a paternity action in Indiana on the day after the birth, prior
to the relinquishment and adoption petition in Utah. He subsequently filed an objection in
the Utah adoption proceeding. However, this Court held that such legal actions avail nothing
because they do not strictly comply with the registration statute. 904 P.2d at 1121. This
Court cited Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, in which the Utah Supreme Court
rejected a paternity registration that was one day late, holding that "strict compliance with
the adoption statutes is reasonable because of the nature of adoptions." Id. This Court also
cited Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the filing of a paternity action was insufficient to satisfy a paternity registration statute,
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even though the adoption court and all interested parties were aware of the father's action.
The Lehr court explained:
The legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and
having the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously that underlie the
entire statutory scheme also justify a trial judge's determination to require all
interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of the
statute. [Id. at 265, emp. added.]
See also Burns v. Crenshaw, 733 P.2d 922 (Or. App. 1987) (unwed father's Washington
paternity action did not satisfy the Oregon registration statute so as to qualify the father for
notice of the Oregon adoption proceeding). Thus, plaintiffs legal actions and various
manifestations of interest are inadequate to protect his rights.
Plaintiffs own fault was in failing to contact a Utah lawyer, or other person with
knowledge of the Utah registration requirement, in time to register a claim of paternity prior
to the relinquishment. Plaintiff admittedly knew of the impending birth and relinquishment
in Utah, and he was advised by three California attorneys of the need to contact a Utah
attorney, yet he failed to do so until it was too late. Plaintiff attempts to blame Denise for
his failure, asserting that he had obtained a California restraining order against her
departure. (App. Br. 25.) However, the supposed restraining order was not mailed to
Denise until more than two months after she had already left California. Moreover, it had
no effect on the child because the child was not yet born. In any event, the supposed order,
by its own terms, had no effect until Denise received "personal service" or signed the waiver
of service, neither of which occurred. (R. 195.) Finally, plaintiff blames the Agency for not
advising him of his legal obligations. (App. Br. 25.) However, the Agency's duty was to
Denise, the Agency's client. The Agency has no duty to advise an unwed father how he can
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defeat the adoption plan of the client-unwed mother; to do so would violate the duty of
confidentiality and loyalty owed to the mother, as well as the mother's right of privacy.
Moreover, plaintiff has cited no authority for such a repugnant proposition.
In summary, plaintiff had sufficient information to protect his own rights, and he
failed to do so. Because he himself bears the fault for failing to register his paternity, he
cannot satisfy the impossibility exception.
3. Registration Within 10 Days After It Became Possible. Finally, plaintiff cannot
show that he actually registered a claim of paternity within 10 days after it became possible
to do so. Even if plaintiff could establish that timely registration was impossible through no
fault of his own, he would still have to show that he registered within 10 days after it became
possible. Adoption ofWy supra, 904 P.2d at 1121 (even if impossibility and lack of fault are
established, father "still must file his notice of paternity within ten days after it becomes
possible for him to file"). But plaintiff admittedly has never registered a claim ofpaternity, not
within 10 days after it became possible, not ever. If registration prior to the relinquishment
was impossible, then it certainly became possible when Denise personally informed plaintiff
of the completed adoption near the end of November 1994. See Adoption of W, supra, 904
P.2d at 1121 (concluding that registration became possible at least when the father was
notified of the pending Utah adoption). In any event, a determination of precisely when
registration became possible in this case is rendered unnecessary by plaintiffs failure to
register at all. By that failure, plaintiff has forfeited the benefits of the impossibility
exception statute. Id.
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Plaintiff attempts to justify his failure to register by arguing that this Court's decision
in Adoption of W is wrong, that registration is not necessary to apply the impossibility
exception, and that an unwed father may, by any means of his choosing, "come forward within
a reasonable time after the baby's birth." (App. Br. 26-28.) However, this is simply a vain
claim that plaintiff is above the law and should be permitted to ignore the registration
statute. Obviously, there is no legal support for this claim. To the contrary, the law is well
established that an unwed father of a newborn child has only an inchoate right, or
"opportunity interest" with regard to the child, and that such right or interest becomes vested
and enforceable only by strict adherence to statutory requirements.

Accordingly, that

provisional right is forfeited or surrendered by failing to comply with statutory requirements.
E.g., Lehr v. Robertson, supra, 463 U.S. at 263-65; Wells v. Children's Aid Society, supra, 681
P.2d at 202-03, 206-07; Adoption of W} supra, 904 P.2d at 1116-20. Even in Ellis, cited by
plaintiff, the father "came forward" by filing a statutory claim of paternity. As stressed by the
Utah Supreme Court in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra:
It is no too harsh to require that those responsible for bringing children into
the world outside the established institution of marriage should be required
either to comply with those statutes that accord them the opportunity to assert
their parental rights or to yield to the method established by society to raise
children in a manner best suited to promote their welfare. [680 P.2d at 756,
emp. added.]
Plainly, to allow unwed fathers to "come forward" by any means and at any time of
their choosing would introduce chaos, confusion, uncertainty, and delay into the adoption
process. Sound public policy requires strict compliance with prescribed statutory procedures.
If an unwed father could choose any convenient means of communicating his interest and
commitment, from verbal assurances and phone calls to letters and legal actions, disputes
19

would invariably arise over whether a communication occurred and what was intended. Such
informal communications are also subject to denial or misrepresentation by other parties.
Informal commitments can easily change or be withdrawn and are therefore difficult to verify
and enforce. If adoption agencies were required to delay adoptions while attempting to
locate and identify committed parties and determine the veracity of conflicting and changing
claims, children would languish in foster care, the privacy of the mother would be violated,
and adoptive parents would lose interest. To avoid such results and facilitate the adoption
process, the Legislature has provided one clear, definitive, and unmistakable means of
demonstrating legal commitment to an out-of-wedlock child, and that is through the timely
registration of a claim of paternity with the Utah Department of Health. See, e.g., Swayne
v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d 637, 641 (Utah 1990); Wells v. Children's Aid Society, supra,
at 203, 206-07; Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, at 755-56.
In summary, plaintiff has failed to satisfy the three conditions for application of the
impossibility exception to timely registration.
C. Cases Prior to Statutory Impossibility Exception,
Plaintiff relies on Ellis v. Social Services, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), and In re
Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), to support application of the statutory
impossibility exception. However, these two cases were decided prior to the impossibility
statute and were based on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. In any event, the two
cases are easily distinguishable from the present case.
In Ellis, the unwed parents were both residents of California, where the father
expected the child to be born. Just before the child's birth, the mother came to Utah without

20

notifying the father. Here, the mother gave birth, declared the father "unknown," and
relinquished the child for adoption.

The father learned of the mother's actions and

registered his paternity in Utah two weeks after the relinquishment.

Despite the late

registration, the Supreme Court held that the registration may be deemed timely if it was
"impossible for the father to file the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar,
through no fault of his own." 615 P.2d at 1256. Because lack of knowledge of where the birth
was to occur may render timely registration impossible, the Court remanded for a hearing on
whether the father could reasonably have expected the child to be born in Utah. Id.
The basis for impossibility in Ellis does not exist in this case because plaintiff
admittedly knew, at least 23 days before the relinquishment, that Denise was in Utah, where
she planned to deliver and relinquish the child for adoption. Even if plaintiff disputes being
notified of Denise's departure for Utah, or communicating with Denise after her arrival in
Utah, he cannot dispute his own allegation in the California complaint that he knew where
Denise was and what she was doing. The Agency's formal notice of October 27, confirming
to plaintiff that Denise was in Utah planning to relinquish the child for adoption, was sent
for the very purpose of avoiding the situation in Ellis. Moreover, the father in Ellis registered
his paternity at the first opportunity, while plaintiff did not. Because plaintiff knew Denise
was in Utah placing the child for adoption, and yet never registered his paternity, Ellis is
distinguishable and provides no support for plaintiffs claim of impossibility. See Sanchez v.
L.D.S. Social Services, supra, 680 P.2d at 755 n.l ("declining] to expand the holding in Ellis
beyond the type of factual situation involved in that case").
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Baby Boy Doe is also distinguishable. There, the father knew the mother was in Utah,
but was misled by the mother's statements that she would keep the baby and marry the
father. The father did not learn of the adoption until one day after the relinquishment, and
he registered a claim of paternity the very next day. 717 P.2d at 687-88. Based on the
mother's misrepresentations, the Supreme Court concluded that the father did not know of
the need to protect his rights through earlier registration; therefore, his late registration was
deemed timely.

Id. at 691.

By contrast, in the present case plaintiff alleges no

misrepresentation regarding the adoption plan. Plaintiff knew of the possibility of adoption
from the third month to the final week of the pregnancy, and Denise never told the plaintiff
that she would not place the child for adoption. Therefore, unlike the father in Baby Boy
Doe, plaintiff knew of the need to protect his rights, and yet failed to register at all.
Accordingly, neither does Baby Boy Doe support plaintiffs claim of impossibility. See Swayne
v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, 795 P.2d at 643 (timely registration is not impossible where
the father was not misled and "should have been aware of the need to protect his parental
rights").
Accordingly, plaintiff has cited no authority to excuse him from timely registration.
D. Evidentiary Hearing.
Finally, plaintiff argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish that
timely registration was impossible. (App. Br. 20-22.) However, this is but another way of
challenging the summary judgment, which, by definition, is entered on the undisputed facts
without a trial. Plaintiff relies on Ellis for the proposition that he is entitled to a hearing to
show that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute. 615 P.2d
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at 1256. However, in Wells v. Children's Aid Society, supra, the Supreme Court expressly
rejected the notion that an evidentiary hearing is required in every case:
[T]he "reasonable opportunity" referred to in the quoted sentence [from Ellis]
only applies "in such a case," i.e., when it is first shown that it was "impossible"
for the father to file "through no fault of his own." Otherwise, the need to
prove in each adoption case that the unwed father . . . had a "reasonable
opportunity" to file the required notice of paternity would frustrate the
statute's purpose to facilitate secure adoptions by early clarification of status.
[681 P.2d at 208.]
Because plaintiff has not shown that timely registration was impossible through no fault of
his own, his status was properly decided as a matter of law, without an evidentiary hearing.
See, e.g., Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, 795 P.2d at 643 (affirming summary judgment
against the father for lack of timely registration).
In summary, plaintiff has provided no factual or legal support for his argument that
he should be entirely excused from registering his paternity on the basis of the statutory
impossibility exception. Therefore, summary judgment was proper.
POINT III:

THE PATERNITY REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.

Plaintiff presented no analysis or authority in the district court for his current claim
that the paternity registration statute violates due process. Therefore, plaintiff is precluded
from raising the due process issue on appeal. See, e.g., James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801
(Utah App. 1987). In any event, the due process argument has no merit, and was expressly
rejected by this Court in Adoption of W, supra.
A. Ten-Day Filing Requirement.
Plaintiff concedes that the requirement of filing a claim of paternity satisfies all due
process requirements, as held in Wells v. Children's Aid Society, supra, and other cases.
23

Plaintiff objects only to the condition in the impossibility exception that the claim be filed
within 10 days after it becomes possible.

Plaintiff argues that the 10-day period is

unreasonable and serves no useful purpose. (App. Br. 28-31.) However, in Adoption ofW,
supra, this Court approved and applied the ten-day period "as the Reasonable time' period
described in Ellis for the putative father to file his notice of paternity when the other two
conditions are met." 904 P.2d at 1119. Even if the other conditions had been met, the father
in Adoption of W "forfeited the benefits of the statute" by failing to register within ten days
after it became possible. Id. at 1121. Regarding due process, this Court observed that the
registration statute has "repeatedly withstood due process challenges" and "has always been
found to be constitutional on its face." Id. This Court also expressly upheld the 10-day
provision:
The requirement that [the father] register his notice of paternity with the State
of Utah within ten days after it became possible for him to do so, while short,
is not impermissibly short. The state has a legitimate and compelling interest
in "expediting the adoption of young children and in protecting the rights and
interests of the child, the birth mother, and the adoptive parents, and therefore
may require that biological fathers, who are in the best position to protect their
own rights, adhere strictly to the requirements of its adoption laws. [Id. at
1122, emp. added, citations omitted.]
Thus, the 10-day rule satisfies due process.
B. Application of 10-Day Rule,
Plaintiff argues that the 10-day rule violates due process as applied to this case
because it serves no purpose in this case. (App. Br. 31-34.) However, plaintiff misconstrues
the purpose of the 10-day requirement, misreads the registration statute, and attempts to
apply the 10-day rule to an extreme hypothetical situation that is far removed from the facts
of this case.
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The purpose of registration is to allow the adoption agency or adoptive parents to
check in one central place, prior to accepting a child for adoption or filing an adoption
petition, to determine conclusively whether the father intends to assert his paternal rights.
See U.C.A. § 78-30-4.8(2). This allows the child and adoptive parents to avoid the pain of
separation after bonding has begun and relationships have formed. See Wells v. Children's
Aid Society, supra, 681 P.2d at 206. An additional search of the paternity registry is made
prior to finalizing the adoption to verify that the father is not contesting the adoption.
Section 78-30-4.8(5). At both stages of inquiry, the agency or adoptive parents also attempt
to determine whether any grounds for the impossibility exception may exist, such as the
father's ignorance of the mother's location, as in Ellis, or his ignorance of the proposed
adoption, as in Baby Boy Doe, If, as in this case, the father knows of the mother's location
and planned adoption, the father has no excuse for not registering, and the adoption may
proceed. If the father may not be aware of the mother's location and adoption plan, then
he is notified of that information, as was done with plaintiff in this case. If the father fails
to register within 10 days after receiving that information (or by the date of the
relinquishment, whichever is longer), then the adoption may proceed. Accordingly, the
10-day rule provides a definite period of time in which a notified father must act, and after
which his objections are barred.
The 10-day rule served its purpose in this case. While the record shows that plaintiff
had sufficient information to protect his rights by at least mid-October 1994, the Agency sent
its October 27 letter to plaintiff out of an abundance of caution to remove any possible basis
for a claim of impossibility. If plaintiff had registered his paternity within 10 days after that
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notice, he could have contested the adoption. In fact, because the relinquishment did not
occur until November 17, plaintiff actually had 21 days from that notice to register. Because
plaintiff failed to register by either deadline, his action is barred.
Plaintiffs hypothetical case of a father registering after the placement, but within 10
days after registration became possible, has no similarity to this case. However, in such a
case, the registration would still be noted prior to entry of the decree (pursuant to
78-30-4.8(5)) and would still entitle the father to contest the adoption, despite the placement.
But if, as in this case, earlier registration was possible, then a late registration is ineffective.
If, as plaintiff claims (albeit without explanation or support), his registration was not possible
until January 1995, then a registration within 10 days thereafter would have been effective
to contest the adoption, despite the placement.

U.C.A. §§ 78-30-4.7 and -4.10.

A

registration at that point would be ineffective only if earlier registration was possible. Thus,
in this case, as plaintiff concedes, any registration after November 17 would be ineffective,
not because the child had already been placed, and not because the registration would go
unnoticed, but simply because earlier registration was possible. In any event, on these facts,
plaintiff has difficulty challenging the 10-day registration period when he has failed to register
at all, ever. Because plaintiff has never registered, he has no standing to argue that the
deadline for registration is unreasonable; for plaintiff not only missed the deadline, he totally
ignored it.
In summary, plaintiff has provided no legal basis or authority for his belated argument
on due process.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's order of summary
judgment in favor of defendants.
Respectfully submitted this *Z£r day of May, 1996.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

David M. McConkie
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
Denise Allan and LDS Social Services
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEES this &H day of May, 1996, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the
following:
Robert L. Moody
MOODY & BROWN
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, UT 84604
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Les F. England
PO Box 680845
Park City, UT 84068-0845
Attorney for Adoptive Parents
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARIO G. BELTRAN,
:
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER
Case No. 950400021

DENISE
ALLAN;
LDS SOCIAL
SERVICES, an Agency of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and
JOHN DOES I through V,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:

Judge Guy R. Burningham

:

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of
defendants Denise Allan and LDS Social Services. The adoptive parents, who joined the
action as Doe defendants, joined in defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff
subsequently filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and requested oral argument

( UUOOl

on the motions.

The Court, having reviewed the file, considered the memoranda

of

counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders as follows:
1. There is no material issue of fact.
2. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (a) plaintiff
has made no efforts to file a notice of claim of paternity with the Utah Department of
Health; (b) plaintiff is barred from asserting any interest in the child and has no right of
consent to the child's adoption, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.8 (1994 Supp.); and (c) the
recent case of In re Adoption of W., 275 U.A.R. 20 (Utah App. 1995), is directly on point
in rejecting plaintiffs legal claims.
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
4. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
5. Plaintiffs request for oral argument is denied, pursuant to Rule 4-501(c)(b),
Code of Jud. Admin., because

"the issue . . . governing the granting [of summary

judgment] has been authoritatively decided."
Dated this So day of November,
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARIO G. BELTRAN,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 950400021

vs.
DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL
SERVICES, an agency of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and JOHN
DOES I through V,

RULING

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration (1995), on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in the
premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1.

Plaintiff has made no efforts to file notice of his claim of paternity with the

Utah Department of Health.
2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4.13 (Supp. 1995) and because In the

Matter of the Adoption of W.. 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (1995), is directly on point,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
3.

Plaintiffs Cross-motion for Summary Judgment is therefore DENTED.

///

00001)4

'*

.*V# '*>

4.

Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(c)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration

(1995), Plaintiffs request for oral argument is DENIED; "the issue . . . governing the
granting [of summary judgment] has been authoritatively decided."
Counsel for Defendants is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court
for signature.
Dated this / /

day of November, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

DAVTD M. McCONKIE
MERRILL F. NELSON
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104
ROBERT L. MOODY
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604

Ruling Page -2-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

ooOoo
Mario G. Beltran,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v*
Denise Allan; LDS Social
Services, an Agency of the
Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints; and John
Does 1 through V,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. 960023
950400021CV

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
For failure of appellant to file the docketing statement
within the time permitted by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
9(a), which time expired on January 19, 1996, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, See Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3(a); provided, however, that if the
docketing statement is submitted within ten (10) days from the
date hereof, the appeal shall be thereby reinstated without
further order of the court*

Date/

(
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FILED
FEB 0 7 1996
COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Mario G. Beltran,
SUA SPONTE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 960079-CA
Denise Allan; LDS Social
Services, an agency of the
Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints; and John
Does I through V,
Defendants and Appellees.

TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
A docketing statement has been filed with the Court of
Appeals in the above-captioned case. This case is being
considered for summary affirmance, pursuant to Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure 10(e), on the ground that the case is
governed by In re Adoption of W r 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 0 (Utah App.
1995). In lieu of a brief, each party shall f i l e a memorandum,
not to exceed ten pages, explaining why summary disposition
should, or should not, be granted by the court. Failure to
respond may result in the granting of this motion.
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be
filed with the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before
February 20, 199 6.
DATED this / ^ d a y of February, 1996.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MAR 1 H 1996

00O00

COURT OF APPEALS

Mario B. Beltran,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant
Case No. 960079-CA
v.
Denise Allan, LDS Social
Services, an Agency of the
Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints; and John
Does I through V,
Defendants and Appellees.

This matter is before the court on its own motion for
summary disposition. Having reviewed and considered memoranda
filed by the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for
summary disposition is denied and that the issues raised by
appellant are deferred until plenary presentation and
consideration of the case. Appellant's opening brief shall be
filed with the clerk of the court on or before April 30, 1996.
Dated this /(/

day of March, 1996

FOR THE COURT:

Judruh M. Billings, Judg
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David M. McConkie (A2154)
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants
Denise Allan and LDS Social Services
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARIO G. BELTRAN,
AFFIDAVIT OF DENISE ALLAN
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 950400021

DENISE
ALLAN;
LDS SOCIAL
SERVICES, an Agency of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and
JOHN DOES I through V,

Judge Guy R. Burningham

Defendants.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
:ss.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
I, Denise Allan, hereby depose and affirm under oath as follows:

000009

1. I am a defendant in the above-entitled action, and I have personal knowledge
of the matters set forth herein.
2. I am 20 years of age, and I have never been married. I was residing with
my parents in the State of California when I began dating Mario G. Beltran in 1993.
3.

In March 1994, I informed Mario that I was approximately one-month

pregnant and that he was the father. I subsequently learned and informed Mario that the
baby was due in approximately November 1994. On multiple occasions after learning of
my pregnancy, we discussed our options, including adoption. After careful consideration
of all the circumstances, I decided that adoption in an established two-parent family would
be best for the baby.
4. In approximately May 1994, I stopped dating Mario and informed him that
I had decided to place the baby for adoption. After that time, in frequent discussions with
Mario regarding the planned adoption, I reaffirmed my adoption plan and never told
Mario that I would not place the baby for adoption.
5. In approximately June 1994, I contacted LDS Social Services in California
regarding placing my baby for adoption in Utah.

In July 1994, I requested Mario to

complete a background information form given to me by LDS Social Services to be used
in placing the baby for adoption. He completed the form, and I later delivered the form
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to LDS Social Services in Utah.

A true and correct copy of that completed form is

attached hereto as Exhibit A.
6. On or about August 15, 1994,1 left the State of California to reside with my
aunt in Provo, Utah, where I planned to complete my pregnancy and place the baby for
adoption.

After arriving in Utah, I contacted the Provo office of LDS Social Services

("Agency") to plan and arrange for the adoptive placement of my baby. My counselor was
Beverly R. Bekker. I identified Mario G. Beltran as the father of my baby.
7. Prior to leaving California, I informed Mario that I was going to Utah to
complete my pregnancy and place the baby for adoption. He accused me of being selfish
and of leaving because I was embarrassed to be carrying his baby, which was not true.
8. Around the first part of October 1994, I called Mario by phone from Utah
to obtain his mailing address so I could mail a letter to his mother. I told him that I was
living with my aunt in Provo, Utah. I thereafter sent a letter to Mario's mother regarding
my progress and adoption plan. While in Utah, prior to the birth, I received two letters
from Mario's mother at my Provo, Utah address. A true and correct copy of the October
17, 1994 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
9. On November 7, 1994, I received a copy of Mario's California paternity
complaint and related documents by certified mail addressed to me at my Utah address.
A true and correct copy of those documents is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
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10. Upon receiving the California complaint from Mario, I called Mario by
phone and expressed to him that I was surprised and disappointed by his action.

I

reaffirmed my decision that adoption was best for the baby and told him that I had
selected an adoptive family and was proceeding with the adoption.
11. On November 14, 1994, I gave birth to a baby girl in a Utah County
hospital. This is the baby that is the subject of this action.
12.

On November 17, 1994, I signed a Relinquishment

and Consent to

Adoption, transferring legal custody of the baby to the Agency for the purpose of placing
the baby for adoption.

A true and correct copy of this document is attached hereto as

Exhibit D.
13. On or about November 25, 1994,1 returned to California, where I presently
reside with my parents and attend college.
14. I still desire that my baby be adopted by the family with whom she was
placed by the Agency. However, if for any reason the adoption is not permitted to be
completed, I desire to retain custody of the child.
DATED this XI ^day of September, 1995.

Denise Allan

-4-
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On this J2 /^
personally appeared

day of September, 1995, before me, the undersigned notary,

DENISE ALLAN, who signed the preceding document in my

presence and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and the
document truthful.

OFFICIAL NOTARY SEAL
JAN SHELLHART
Notary Public — California
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My Co mm Expires OCT 17,1995

-<^w
J*£

$
ft
jl
t
L

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at /&,r/!L^

My Commission Expires:

O^SMFNMXlS^S\Mma^tul Uf
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
(Birth Father)

EXHIBIT

A

^ ^ This BACKGROUND INFORMATION form is designed to provide you and us with a tool wherein
gniiicant social and medical information about your child's heritage is collected. If you plan adoption for
our child, the identifying information you supply will be kept confidential. General information will be
lared with your child's new family. If you have chosen to raise this child, you may wish to use this form
) preserve information about yourself and the child's mother for future use.
You will notice that various types of information are included in this form. The agency will need
)ine of tills material in choosing the most suitable home for your child and to share background information
1 tii the child's new family. The medical information, in particular, is asked for the purpose of early
bareness, identification and treatment of future conditions your child may develop. We urge you to keep
e agency informed of health problems you, your parents, your brothers or sisters, or your future children
ight develop.
Perhaps die most important purpose of tills information will be to answer questions your child may
Lve about you. We have included questions of physical appearance, interests, talents and education,
uestions have been included to help your child understand, your placement decision. Please feel free to
elude additional information that you may feel is important. Some of the specific facts asked may not be
r
ai]able or known.
This BACKGROUND INFORMATION is limited in many ways. It indicates a sketch of you at this
ne. Changes that may be of major importance to your child will occur to you in the future; therefore,
Iditional information can be added at any future time by contacting your adoption agency or your worker.
The accuracy and care that you use in completing this form will be greatly appreciated by your child,
e new family, and the agency. Thank you for your help.

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
(Information in shaded area will not be released)
Same of Falhcn

MfiR\Q

&RCc.\fr fi^T<?fl;u

Dale of Birth:

PUce of Birth:

Proem Add,o,:

C ,

Sirct

Permanent Addxas;
/7

Street

V&t

rV/>>r f :,7,r.^

»

City

rr.A'r

Coun,)r

County

UU^tS.

000014

/£.

*7

^

Sut* ' Zip

C .fr,

Q^So

NON-IDEN . VING BACKGROUND IN; OlATION
(Please use black ink)
Child's birth date or due date:

Sex of child (if known):

nformation Provided by:

_^£mF\LG_

Date:
(SLIIX rtUuonihip to child only, i.e. mother, fithtr. etc)

Nationality Background (e.g., German, English, etc)facial Background(s), (e.g., white, black, etc.):

U\sp^A)gr

Ofl-DujfVJ

f Native American (Indian), what Tribe(s):
Where enrolled:
)ESCRIPTION:
leight: S~1Q

Usual weight:

'ompiexion: Fair

((^Q

Hair color:
Dark

Olive

Medium

hysical features (e.g., big/small boned, long/short limbed', muscular, etc.):

/hat are your interests/taients/hobbies:

^^rPftH

/

Eye Color: bf? ftojrJ

Yxicx^fv
*

Right/left handed

^oVy}-

fHCcM 0ry> i—D^\ *Q

fooVt*?/^

/hich of the following describe your personality (check all that apply):
Stubborn
Temperamental

Self-confident
Serious
Shy

J^Nervous
Outgoing
Rebellious

"A Friendly
_^_Happy
Irresponsible

)( Aggressive
Calm
y Emotional

J&

Unhappy

DUCATION:
ast grade completed:

\X

Presently in school: Yes a

uture plans for schooling:

.—

ubjects interested in:

Avg. grades:

U rvW.£ r o v i e r t tr>.^glr -fcc? p s l l r p , &>K ^ F H i r ^ '

xtracurricular activities:

_—

Jiy school-related problems or challenges:
additional training:

No ^

£

Og

ft-P^e>V^

Reld

•

—

f\fcA^

P^Tl^-

IMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
lurrent occupation:

9-os,

Military service: Yes a

(°H* ScMUrvo Cc/np<v^
NoV

Previous occupation::

Branch of service:

0U0015
2

Tt^<;r4-

fl"^*

>K\*<>

McdicaJ
Condition

(

1 Y«

No

J

\C

l^

fl

V

;fn:
' fever
ima
:s/Eczcma

(Self]

Ycs-Rcbiivc
(specify)

J

S&e

I

j

Comments

0 « u ^ - c c x * ^ ^ ^ ^

s

^

CCC6(n\g

<

X

:s (soccifv)
' (specify)

1 UIV>.

V

' (SDCCifv)

/

y

u:

\cpwd &&<*><!

Xy

efects:

1y

p/clcft paJatc
bot

x

litaJ heart

specify)

X
What kind? Age at onset? Part of body?

K

rx

Dependencv/Abujc

How long used? How often?

>c

y
3

/

'JCS

X

Qrt/ifli&CtMin
1

•

;

—^A utoh

.

nines

* i

lenics

^

-

*

LJACI^
*

JZZ

\ pills

_y

rs

_K

y]

ms:

Hal Illncsa:

t
sion
jion

1

v

1

"7

1

r ,-k

x
1

Specify type:

Specify type; age at diagnosis; medications:

foftXp'CdfcK.

*

>c

"7
y

3
/

menLs:

A

|

X
Isions:

[

Age al onset? Treatment? Hospitalization?

Age at onset? Frequency0 Treatment?
I

Specify mild, moderate, severe; type and age at onset:

01)0016

J|

Medical
Condition

n

J No

1

Yes-Relative
(specify)
Age and outcome;

Y

Heirt Dbcase:

Comments

X

-Heart murmur

n/x* \ rue

X

-High blood pressure

1

-Stroke

\L

-Heart attack

y

r,tarc£ £<#*•/.

J ^V«C^ -

QSC(\

Qf?Aroc5 t ^ V V ^ r t
1

y.

-Other (specify)
Hereditary DLseases

V

-Cystic Fibrosis

x

1X
1X y

-Hemophilia
-Hypothyroidism
-Galactosemia
-Huntington's Disease

X
X
X

-Obesity
-SicJdc Ceil Anemia
-Other (specify)

Type of education? Medication?

Hvperacfiviry/Learning
Disabilities:

y

Kidney Disease:

X

Liver Disorders:
Lang Disease:

i

X

Multiple Births:

J,

Neurological: Disorders:
1

What pan of body? Both sides? How severe?

*

-Cerebral PaJsv
-Other paraJysis or
crippling disorders

1

Rheumatic Fever:

1

Sexually Transmitted Diseases: 1
1

Jt

I

o t ?AvU^V>eYi
Did heart murmur result?

y
y

X

"x

-Syphilis
-Herpes Progcnilalis

±i
y 1
x I

-Multiple Sclerosis

-Gonorrhea

Specify type:

X

Any diagnosis or cause? Hospitalized?

Mental Retardation:

-Muscular Dystrophy

Specify type:

X

1

f\0(\+~ M t c ^ S x ^ ^ d

*1

v 1

-HIV/AIDS
-Other (specify)

*

Visual Disorders

X

-Blindness

X

-Far/near sighted?
astigmatism? *
-Color blindness
-Other (specify)

I

pon-V

y

X
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you wish to add a more detailed biot.-pf
sketch of yourself in the file, please f, J
D do so at anytime. This would be
(formation shared with your child and the aaopti\e parents of your child. It would give them a more personal understanding of
DU as a person. (Please use back of form if you need additional space.)
°
Earliest recollections/memories or experiences from your growing up years.

h f l ^ f ] , X h ^ ^ ©(f££\en<L^. evl«tf.<^*v^ 4 + ^ h / ^ o > ^ # ThM- m ^ ^ t - O o * \ ^
to
U5<UA / n u p A ^ c ^ ^ ^ too-*- S
A \ ^ « ^ Y S CcV ^ ( ^ ^ ^ V *^V 9/lA"d p^men-K. nlooV rn-onr^rt.i'el

0^

Describe your childhood and feelings about parents, brother and sisters. How do you think your earlier life has helped make
you the person you are?

u v ^ x u ^ cfou^ ^ r>,0 ^ ^ ^ ^

^e ^ ^ ^ e

b U i baV h<L voool^

^

s

Accomplishments during your life (include school, church or other events you are proud of):

A*cVfiex \f> <v^roc o ^ s

^ ^

t w ^ &V)^ ^

ksep

Uiem.'

Goals or hopes for the future:
One.

qofA

\5 i-o q e ^

tyi^'bas^

jeb X

CjqnD

Vo S c p p o r t V r ^ t M - j ^ o

A*d t o <7 r^e. V^*.

Do you have any health concerns you would specifically wish to explain in detail?

ilone

Briefly describe your work or school, sharing the enjoyment you derive from it and importance it has in your life. If you have
not decided or you arc not yet working toward a career goal, describe your thoughts about working.

9C ^ ^

^ ^

io

col^e

fl^

^fttal"

^XL S-he. top.

What are your feelings about religion (religious preference, church activity, positions held, etc.)?

000018
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IUJJU<-

V'—}

uuvT

JKJU

jci.

JTUUI^CJI

<t

j — umers see you.

Ou'/n-eo

I.

What is the most important thing, either positive or negative, that you have had to handle in your life? What was the impact
of it on your life and did it affect your present outlook on life?

0. What is your current relationship with your child's birth mother?

fr^by
u ^ ^ i d JT d o ^ W - cJo A s e ^ M £ ^ Y * e . r > 7 o ^ e ^ > U n , ^ J ^ / +
' < F ^ , B v j V - X ^ r x w ^ C) x C C g n ^vrf c W \ e . /w*s*\eru. 5 ^ s h e n ^ c i s
UohtvV / ^ l £
Atvi m v ^ -C^^w^ ta> <U~>c. b a b ^ c o ^ . ^rz_-e A r ^ , ] ^
1. Indicate below your reasons for making a placement plan for your child.

/ £«"*
/V - f ^ J y

W

h
b a

^
| .

l. Indicate below your preferences, if any, regarding the selection of an adoptive family.

DDITIONAL INFORMATION:
st any geographic areas to avoid in placing the child for adoption:

there any non-identifying information you do not want shared with the adoptive family or child/adult?

jndcrstand that non-identifying information, other than what I have stated above, may be shared with the adoptive family or
ild/adull.

(If form was not completed by birth father, sign and indicate your relationship to the birth father)

(Dat£)

(Signature)

BF-BKGNDFRM
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m

m.

o

-n-'if

V

/-^^

#1

C^J^AM.

~'*^?/£
*rZ:<
sr*~<

m
r **<

^2^

<W&Ji

m

^ dfa~y i/h^ /^n y^
'Z^J^.*\

mk4

£

m^
mUAJ,

0
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/

v

/£--

^/uu^J^Z-

^i^_

trim
'-C^x^^

j&t^L c^Z 4 £t&^

*-N.

•• / J ;

V'rt'i

lO-Gl*.

ST.

r#^
J^1

•irs^

F-M

33^

3§
fc£
^

^?l_

°yr
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Jt^->

fr Mr^- &

Julia Word How c .= \

&n i ^ e .

...I""'-

ll,,lMl,.l.ll,.ll,.nlH!, l l!.l.l.. l lMl..ll.!..l. l ..lllln.
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* - * LEGAL SECRETARY

43770 N. 43770 15TH. S T . E
LANCASTER, CA 93534

November j , iy?t

Denise Allan
281 East 2950 North
Provo, UT 84604
Re:

Complaint to Establish a Paternal
Relationship
Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. PF000505

Dear Ms.

Allan:

Please find enclosed a copy of the Complaint to Establish
a
Paternal Relationship
that Mr. Beltran has filed in this
action
wherein he is requesting custody of the child not yet born.
Please be advised that the summons states that you must
an answer in the Court here within 3 0 days from date of service,
Mr. Beltran will get his judgment of paternity
by
default.
Please find enclosed a Notice of Acknowledgment and
that you need to sign and return to my office -so that it
filed with the court.

file
or

Receipt
may be

By signing the uNotice of Acknowledgment and Receipt" you are
not agreeing to anything, you are just saying that you received
the
paperwork and that a marshall or process server does not have to
serve you.
Please return the "Notice of Acknowledgment and
Receipt"
signed and dated where Indicated by the x's in the enclosed,
selfaddressed
envelope.
I am not an attorney.
I do not represent Mario, and am acting
only as a typing service in this matter.
Mario has consulted
with
an attorney and is going to pursue his legal rights regarding
the
child.

enc.

as

stated

Carol
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Pauley

T Ofl PARTY WITHOUT ATTOflHEV IftMJm

TELEPHONE NO

iflOAaaan*)

(805)

0 G. BELTRAN
7 CENTURION WAY
US, CA 91350

FOR COIflT Use ONLY

296-1070

°HI^AL

:TFOR m,,*) PLAINTIFF IN PRO PER
IOR COURT OP CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
rRfETACoaess 9 1 1 F I R S T STREET

°CT26

log

AXQEL.<fis.

B;u CHWAM6-

"

S A N

FERNANDO,

#94

'v******
*$&#

JUNCACDfi£S3 S A M E

rwoziPcooe

nUQ

CA 9 1 3 4 0

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

PLAINTIFF: MARIO G.

BELTRAN

DEFENDANT. DENISE ALLAN
COMPLAINT TO ESTABUSH PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP
(Unrform Parentage Act)
REQUEST FOR ORDER FOR \jgj CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
I | CHILD SUPPORT

cxs£«uua£2:

PFnnnno:i

lalntiff brings this action to determine whether a parent and child relationship exists between
name)' MARIO G. BELTRAN
and the following children:
(
|
Child's name
Date of Dlrth

Age

) 1 X la child who Is not yet born.
| An application for an order prohibiting domestic vioienca under the Uniform Parentage Act is attached,
("he court has Jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant
1 X 1 resides in this state.
1 X \ had sexual intercourse in this state that resulted in conception of the children listed In Item 1.
other (specify):
fha action Is brought In this county because
i. (" X l the child resides or Is found In the county.
o \
| a parent Is deceased and proceedings for administration of the estate have been or could be started in the county
Plaintiff Is
a. I | the mother.
b. I X I the father.
c I ) the child or the child's personaf representative (speedy court and date of appointment).

d.C5]otnar(spec//yj: F a t h e r wishes t e s t i n g t o d e t e r m i n e
Plaintiff claims
if he is the father.
a. X

defendant Is the child's parent
defendant, who is the child's parent, has failed to support the child.
(name):
has furnished or Is furnishing the following reasonable
expenses of pregnancy, blrtn, education, or support for which the defendant as parent of the child is obligated.
Amount
Payable to
For (specify).

b. rn
cl

I

d. (

J other (specify);

ira tawkfng an order rognrdlng custody or visitation 0/ minor chlldr$nf chack lt$m 7 a or 7b.
a L X j Each child named In Item la Is presently living with [ j £ j plaintiff I [defendant
at (address optional) C h i l d d u e N o v e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 9 4
and during tne last five years has lived In no state other than California and wltn no parson other than plaintiff or defendant
or botn Plaintiff has not participated in any litigation or proceeding In any state concerning custody ot these children
Plaintiff has no information or any pending custody proceeding or of any parson not a party to this proceeaing who has
physical custody or claims to have custody or visitation rights concerning thase children
b ( I A completed Declaration Under Uniform Custody of Minors Act Is attached. Cf you have not checked item 7a. you
must attach tfys declaration )

ilT\ff<(Name): MARIO G. BELTR. /

~

~T

lOAUT(Name): DENISE ALLAN

J

' '

"

"

;—i

_^^

r e q u e s t s t h e c o u r t to make t h e determinations i n d i c a t e d below.
RENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
t x \ Defendant I x I Plaintiff
I

I Other

U

is the parent of the children listed in item 1.

(specify):

CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
a. | x I C u s t o d y

I request the following custody orders

(specify):

Sole legal and physical custody of the minor child if tests determine
the child is his biological child.
b- I

I Visitation (Name):
(1) I
I none. (2) I

I reasonable visitation.

(3) I

should have the right to visit the children as follows:
I visitation with the following r e s t r i c t i o n s (specify):

c. Facts in support'of the requested c u s t o d y and visitation orders are
I

(specify):

I cgntained in thq a t t a c h e d declaration.

The Plaintiff herein has .moved to Utah and .plans to release the
child for adoption. She is planning on moving back here as soon
as the child has been placed. Plaintiff requests DNA/blood tests.
d. [
'equest
]

I l request mediation to work out a parenting plan.
an order

for child

support

or attorney

fees, attach

a completed

Income

and Expense

Declaration

(Family

La*).

CHILD SUPPORT
a. |

| Public assistance is being provided the children.
I

I (Name):

should be ordered to pay reimbursement for public assistance to

the children in the amount of: S
b. I

c I
]

I (Name):
Child's name

as of Cdare):

Sirthdate

, and up to the time of trial.

should be ordered to pay sucport as s p e c i f i e d :
Monthly amount
Payable to

I
I and pay arrearages for support of the children from the date of filing this complaint up to time of trial,
I A wage assignment for child support I
I and arrearages
should be ordered.

NAME C H A N G E I request an order changing the children's names, pursuant to Family Code s e c t i o n 7533, as follows (specity)

] FEES AND C O S T S O F LITIGATION
Plaintiff requests that the court order defendant to pay for
attorney fees
b. expert tees, guardian ad litem tees, and other c o s t s of the action or pretrial proceedings.
under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and c o r r e c t .

/ 2 5 / 9 4

G

/... BE . LT ^ N

...

_ M^AcuL, kT^jbfeg:

CTfP£ 0 3 PRINT NAWSJ

• Answer

- Complaint

to Establish

(SIC.HATUSE OF PUUNTlFr)

Parental

Relationship

NOTICE TO OEFENOANT

form must be served

on the defendant

with this

complaint.

AVISO ALACUSAOO

'ou cannot afford an attorney and desire to have one,

Si usted no puede pagarle a un abogado, y quiere que un

f ask the court to appoint an attorney to represent vou.

aboaado lo reoresente. ccdra oecirte a la c o r t e aue le nombre

SUMMONS
(CITACION JUDICIAL)
racoLflruseo/vi.y

OTiCE TO DEFENDANT: (Aviso aAcusado)
DENISE ALLAN

&QLQ PAPA USQD6LA CORT£)

OU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF:
\ Ud. le esta demandando)
MARIO G. BELTRAN

You hava 30 CALENDAR DAYS aftsr this aurrh
mona la served on you to fHe a typtwritten response at tnia court.
A lattar or phone catf ulU not protect you; your
typewritten response must ba In prop«r lagal
form If you want tha court to hoar your case.
if you do not file your response onfc'ms,you may
lose the case, and your wages, money and property may be taken without further warning from
the court
There are other IegaJ requirements. You may
want to calJ an attorney right away, if you do not
know an attorney, you may call an attorney referral service or a legal aid office Ofated In the phone
book).

Ditpuit d$ qui /# gntriguan erf* ctUcldn Judicial UMtud
l/a/ra un pfuo d% 30 DIA8 CALENDARIOS par* prtsandr
vm raapufi/a itc/llm a miqulnt in §M(M com.
Un* carta o una lUmid* fc/etf/r/c* no /• o/rtcc/i
prottccjon; su riiputtti
ucrftm a miqulnt (fan* qui
cvmplfr con /at formtUdidis ligiJit Mpropltdzs si yttad
quleri qua /a corf* ncuchi au caaa.
Si u*t&d no prvtinU m ntpuostM a Uampo, puQda porder
9lc*soryl9pu9dQnqutt*rsu *MlirjQ,Mu dlntroyoUzscQtax
dm tu proplad*d *Jn *vt*o tdJdonalpor part* da la corf*.
Exlftoa ot/Q* riqutetto* /igata*. Puede qua ustad qufan
lUmtr a un ttogido tnmadUlimmtQ. SI no conoca a un
mbogado, puedt Ilaoiar A un tarvfclo da referenda da
abogido* o a um ollclni da jjri/cU lag*! (voa. a/ dlrectarlo
lafaf6nJco).
CAS£ NUU3E

'ha name and address of the court is: (Elnombrey dJr&cc]6n de la corta ds)
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
DA

\imWmoT

PFnrfnson

NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT
120 North Maciay Strort
San Fernando, CalHomfca t^WS

^ ^ North MscJay Street

*ORTH VALLEY DISTRICT

rha name, address, and talepnona number of plaintiffs attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney. Is:
Elnombrv. la dlrecclSn y el numero de te&fono delabogado del demandante. o del demandante que no b'ena abogado. es)

(805)

296-1070

MARIO G. BELTRAN
21827 CENTURION WAY
SAUGUS, CA 91350

3ATE:

OCT 2 6

^fficQfo*---

ClerX, by
(ActuArio}

CS£AU

__, Deputy

NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You ara served
1. C23 as an individual defendant.
2. •
as tha parson suad under tha fictitious name of (specify):
3. •

on behalf of (specify):

under:

A I

I

•
•
•
PI

CCP 4Id 10 (corporation)
CCP 41&20 (defunct corporation)
CCP A 1&40 (association or partnership)
other:

hv/npr<5nnalf1fl!ivprvonfctefa);

( 1 CCP 4 16.60 (minor)
( I CCP 416.70 (conservatea)
( I CCP 4 16.90 (individual)

O 0 0 0 2 f >

STANDARD RESTRAINING ORDER - Uniform Parentage Act
PROHIBICION JUDICIAL ESTANDARE - Ley Unlforrne de Paternldad

STANDARD UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT RESTRAINING ORDER
nd the other party are restrained from
/Ing the minor child or children for whom this action seeks to establish a parent-child relationship from the
without the prior written consent of the other or an order of the court.
* restraining orders are effective against petitioner upon filing a petition and against respondent on personal serthe summons and petition or on waiver and acceptance of service by respondent.
are effective until the final decree Is entered, the petition Is dismissed, or the court makes a further order.
>rders are enforceable anywhere In California by any law enforcement officer who has received or seen a copy

PROHIBICIONES JUDICIALES ESTANDARES - LEY UNIFORMS DE PATERNIDAD
\lr de este momento, a usted y a la otra parte se las prohibe
saquen del estado al hijo o hljos menores de las partes, para qulenes esta acclcn Judicial procura establecer
elaclon entre hljoy padres, sin el consentlmlento previa por escrlto de /a otra parte o sin una orden de la corte.
m

3 prohlblciones Judlclales entrardn en vigencia para el demandante una vez presentada la petlcidn, y para el
dado una vez que ^ste reclba la notlflcacldn personal de la cltacldn Judicial y petlcidn, o una vez que renuncle
>cho a reclWr dicha notiflcacldn y se 66 por notlflcado.
Inuaran en vigencia hasta que se dicte la declsldn final, la petlcidn sea rechazada o la corte explda Instrucclones
lales.

3n hacerse cumpllr en cualquler parte de California por cualquler agente del orden publico que las haya reclbldo
laya visto una copla de ellas.

• NOTICE erk shall attach this restraining order to the original civil summons and all copies Issued In a proceeding
the Uniform Parentage Act. Proof oi Its service shall be shown on the proof oi service filed with the court.

000027
>ted by Rule 1296.61

m,nrj m r*,lf„mi»

STANDARD RESTRAINING O R D E R S

(Uniform Parontag* Act)

Coda of Civil Procure. Hi2.2t(b)

TELEPHONE NO: ( 8 0 5 )

J£ AXO *OOR£SS OP SCNDea;

296-107CJ

For Coun Use Only:

ARIO G. BELTRAN
1827 CENTURION WAY
AUGUS, CA 913 50
iari name or court, JucJioaf district & branch court. If «ny, and Post Offlca ana sirwlAddrros

UPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
2 0 NORTH MACLAY STREET
AME
AN FERNANDO, CA 913 40
-AINTIFF: MARIO G. BELTRAN

:F£NDANT:

DENISE ALLAN

NOTICE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT

PF000505

TO: .DENISE ALLEN
(Insert naroo of indrvldua! beiog servad)

This summons and other document(s) indicated Delow are being SQrvad pursuant to Section 415.30 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure. Your failure to complete this form and return it to me within 20 days may subject you (or
the party on whose behalf you are being served) to liability for th9 payment of any expenses Incurred in serving a
summons on you In any other manner permitted by (aw.
Jf you ara being sarved on behalf of a corporation, unincorporated association (including a partnership), of other
entity, this form must be signed by you in the name of such entity or by a person authorized to receive service of
process on behalf of such entity. In ail other cases, this form must be signed i^y you personally or by a person authorized
Dy you to acknowledge receipt of summons. Section 415.30 provides that this summons and other document(s) are
deemed served on the date you sign the Acknowledgment of Receipt below, If you return thi^form to me.

Dated: N o v e m b e r . 0 3 , . 199.4
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT
This acknowledges receipt of: (To be completed by sender before mailing)
1. •
A copy of the summons and of the complaint
2. •
A copy of the summons and of the Petition (Marriage) and:
•
Blank Confidential Counseling Statement (Marriage)
•
Order to Show Cause (Marriage)
iZH Blank Responsive Declaration
•
Blank Financial Declaration

,

E 3 other: (specify)A copy of the Summons, Standard Restraining Orders,
Complaint: to Establish a Paternal Relationship, Certificate of
Assignment and blank Answer
CTo b« co»pl*t*d by r»clpl»oO

Date of receipt:
(3/gnaiuro c( person id^owis^ylng toceipi, w;rn tin* rf
Jtcicncv».^€c2gmcrn !J .Tada an behalf of anolnar owson)

DENISE ALLEN

Date this form is signed:

000028

(Type or print your nana and nama of Bntiry. If any,
on wMoja banal/ tn»$ 'cm is Bignad)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
CA3£TITLE BELTRAN v s .

ALLAN

CASE NUMBER

PFnnrison

CERTIFICATE OF ASSIGNMENT
lie this certificate with all cases presented for filing In all districts of the Los Angeles Superior Court.
The under H g n t d deciaraa that tho above anUHod r u n or la Wed for prccaedinge in tna

N O R T H

V A L L E Y

DisWctof

the L o t i ^ g i l i i Superior court unde/ 3eo>on 332 * eeq.. Coda of CMl Procadum ana flun 2 Cc) and Co) of true coon (or ma reasons checfcad b tfcw.
Tha a d d r a i a of tha a e c i d v U , performance, p^ny. detention, p l i c a of b u a l n M a , ex olner facie* which quah'flet lh>a c i i a /or nnng in m a aoove daslgnatad diatnct

is (not rtqulnd for non-tort case*filedIn Central District);
1 HAUE: tlNOICATE TITLE OS OTHEfl aiUL^YINC f ACTOH)

AOOflCSSi

PLAINTIFF
Ccrrr)
[SAUGUS_
JURY TRIAL

21827
tSTATH

|

CENTURION WAY

(ZIP CODE}

91350

CA
C £ ] NON-JURY TfllAl

TIKE ESTIMATED FOR TBUL

C U H O U R S / C D DAYS.

JRE OF ACTION

GROUND

NATURE OF ACTION

GROUND

A.7 t 00 VonkSa Aca'd on I

Tna c a u t o of action arose within lha

t

*72lOUedUaicracCca

alBUicL

C D A5525 Summary a s s e r t i o n

Onaorr*areaflhepaMy
liUganla (aside a withm tha
district."

Of

A7200 other Personal Inj.
A7220 Product Lfacwry

ana or mora dafandanta raaidaa within

A605Q Other Waipractica

lha district

A£Ot2Caitecl">civNota

) « S 2 0 Ragular Dissolution

I

1 A5530 Nullity

I

1A5610 Legal Separation

C D A6t35 Far&gn Support
Of

|

A6C40 injunci Relief

Rule 2 a/Jews filing In Cantral DIaIrlcl

(_ J A6122 Qoneslic Violence

&£030 DecLar Relief

Cnon-lorts ontyl

I

46170 Lata Claim Rsilflf

m

*£ooo other CompJt.

f

•iW:
*6011 Concraa

A7300 E/Tunent Odr&a»n
hSozo Landiord/Tanant

I A5130 FaraJty Law Complain c-0 in er

A6132Palamrcy
) Afltat OAPatamity (DAuse onfyl

Aula 2}
C M d rasldoa or dacaasad
father'* probata would Da
filed In lha d i s t r i c t . "

L

3 A6l33QAAgraimgnl (DAusacnfr)

f

1 A6101 Agancy Adopton

Petitioner raaidaa wiihm

provided f o r . "

(

1Afi i 02 independent Adoption'

tna dtstrlcL«*

The administrative tribunal la tocitad

» 6 H I SialerSiala Judgment
17221 Aab^alOBia

U u a l ba (Had in tho Coo trail D Usenet

•613«H.E.3.L.
fcSiti Ulnora Contract
A£i$0£jacUon Corneal

Consent to out-of-slale

1

I A £ 103 Adult Adopuon

(

1 AS 106 Sola Custody Peu'Bcn

adapUon,conaantar

(

| A£ 105 Abandcnmanl

resides within the district.**

1

1 >6210 Pro&ata W*-Littara Twiajiantavy

Oecadenl resided within

district."

Tha judgment debtor holda propany
within lha dlalricl**

or

C Z ] >fi 104 Siepparent Adoption

Tha proper(y is locatad wltnln tna

within Che district**
A£t$oxbairac!

ruing In Cantral Oislrict -

Parrwrtanca in tha district ia expreeaty

A6060 Roat Propony RlghtH

A6t 40 Admin Award

LNol a requirement for

1 A£136 Foreign Custody

d ] A6211 Prooata w\»-LalIa/fl AdmnJalralion

the disirict»f

CZ] A6212 Letters of AdminlslraUcn
(

0/

I A£213 Letters of SpeaaJ Acvwiislrahan

Decadent resided out of

(ZZI A6215 SpoUMl Property

tho district, but held

I

I A6216 Succaaalon Jo flaaJ Property

property with in the d i s t r i c t "

r

) MS2\7 Sut*majy Probata

(

I A6218 Smail Efltala C13200 PC)

Psliooner, conaervataa or"

or

[

] A6230 Ccnsjtfvalom h»g P U

w a r d raaidaa wiin>n irua

»6iiONMaChan&a

One or mora of tt\& p*rcy wcigantt

t

j A£Z31 Cona«rvato/anip Parson

district'*

fc6t2l C M l r U r a a s n a n t

f M i d e s within lha diclnct.**

I

| A6232 ConBervitonhtp CaUta

»6t00Qtnef Paction

(

IA6233 Uadicii TrwlrMnl witneut Content

jfy):

!

I A6240 Cuardiansh«p P I C

LZZI A£24t c u o / d i a n f h o Paracn
t o i £ i Ma/ida/nus*

m a ae/ano«ni f u n a j o n t wnoity wiinin

(

I A6242 Cua/dJmnthtp C i t a u

^Qi52Pfon,cxLon«

tha d t a t f c i . * *

I

] AfiZO Soou^» Lacx* Capaaty

(

I A62S4 TnJSt PfOCflfldingi

(

| AQ2CO Probata oihar

*£\5Q OcnefWTlt*

CSpaary):
V66O0 H.C. f amity Law

Cnild la hrtd w^t^^ tha D.atnct««

:Iara under panaity of perjury under tha laws of tha State
allfornla that tha foregoing Is true and correct and this
aratlonwaa executed on 1 0 - 2 5 - 9 4
ANCASTER
California
o o a t i v a writs c o n c e r n i n g a c o u r t of i n f e r i o r JurismctTo

[

_^

J AA2aa Coop user's cu.ni

••Or, Rule 2 allows optional filing In Central Oistrict.

CS)CKATUP.£ Cf AnORN£Y/f ILING PAPTYj

filed In Central Oistrlct. IN PRO

PER

f-if-M-l

Official Business
^.PENALTY FOR P P i V A T p l
USE TO AVCIO PAYMENT—
- t f ^ r ' C F POSTAGE.-S3COgj^i

".Print your name, address and ZIP Code here

p^l
GA Q ^ S O

SUu^vtf

p HIT m a

3E3

Receipt for
- Certified Mai!
•_ imiwi

No Insurance Coverage P.-ovicaa
Qo not use ' a * International Wail
'See Heve's?

UU<£y ^ ?

/ /,.

<^2Z^z^y

'ygxr*""/JT m*/
Postage
Cirti/.-o

=,

Jv>A &•

3:>*cQj"Ce.r.-*-,

£e:eco

^

to\%<5£y i I i : « C*.-.e<ed
r<»tur% • » - • . ; ; ^ ; 3 ~ a \ \ - -

a v.-\a

TOTAL Pzi'iZz
& feci

o
o

Pcstmaf. :* Z-n

CO

n

000030
|

dnJUuv^J

a.

SENDER:

I also wish

(3

• Complete items 1 and/or 2 for additional services.
• Complete items 3. and 4a & b.

12
a
<jj
^
,-

• Print your nama and address-'on tha reverse of this fnrm «n ***r w r-m
fee):
return this card to y o u .
• . A t t a c h this form to tht iraru or ina m«nyioi.c or an r n * m r i ? it M J C C
1. D
doas not permit.
• Writs "Return Rw^w H v .• ^v»ww-»wv. « . . « . „ iijau^jicce aeiow tna a r a c e numoer.|

M

— • J h e R e o i m Receipc will show to whom"tha article w a s d e l i ' v * " ^ ' ™ * r S ^ d a t delivered.
O —
•
:
L l _ > ,
_

•a " 3 . Article A d d r e s s e d t o : . * v - ' - ^ » * .

. ^_-

to

receive

the

following cervices (for an extra

^ > > A ^y->

^

Addressee's

Address

2. & Restricted Delivery

a
CO

c.

Consult postmaster for fee.

4 a . ^ A r t i c l e Number. .-:•:

^ "

g
*5>

.-_,.

egistered^SLd-Insured^^^7^-^-?t:
^ m f ied^^^SQjCOO^

^V ?^^ >^V s^ - ^^J Ka: >.^ &l ^ ^* C ^v l efT iC nvflecetpc*
^ ^
=

?6fef£5iSr7«S®BGS

RELINQUISHMENT AND CONSENT TCTJbjOPTION
(BIRTH MOTHER-UTAH)

&m\m

STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF

:ss
)

PTAH

D^

being Erst duly sworn on oath, depose and say:
i. I am the mother of a
14

-F--

day of M c v C r r t b o ^ , 19 ^ 4 , at

(male/tgmaig) child who was born at 3'3G<=^rx-(timc)
-PrfrJO

_ City,

L^-t < 9 > - ^

on the

County, State of Utah.

2. Because I feel that it is in this child's best interests to be placed for adoption, I hereby release and relinquish
this child to the care, custody and control of LDS Social Services, for placement for adoption.
3. I fully understand that by signing this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption I am giving up all of my
parental rights to this child, and that my decision to place this child for adoption with LDS Social Services is final and
I cannot change my mind.
4. I consent to the legal adoption of this child by any persons with whom LDS Social Services places this child
for adoption. I understand that LDS Social Services will use its best efforts to place this child with the adoptive parents
I may have selected in consultation with LDS Social Services. I understand and agree that if I have not selected adoptive
parents or if LDS Social Services, in its sole and absolute discretion, decides that this child should be placed with other
adoptive parents or that it is not in the child's best interest for the adoptive parents I have selected to complete the
adoption, LDS Social Services may place this child for adoption with any adoptive parents LDS Social Services selects.
5. I understand and agree that LDS Social Services may, in its sole discretion, release its custody, and control
over this child to another licensed child placing agency for adoptive placement within said other agency's sole discretion.
6. I waive the right to notice of any and all legal proceedings which may be held in courts of the State of Utah,
or elsewhere, in connection with the adoption of this child.
7. I have read the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption and I fully understand its terms and
conditions. My decision to relinquish this child to LDS Social Services and to consent to the adoption of this child has
been made voluntarily and of my own free will and choice. I am signing this Relinquishment and Consent to Adopdon
freely and voluntarily, without any coercion, force or duress and without any payment or promise to pay any money or
other thing of value for the purpose of inducing me to place this child for adoption, consent to an adoption, or cooperate
in the completion of an adoption.
8. I agree that this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption shall be executed and interpreted according to the
laws of the State of Utah, and I agree to submit myself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah with regard to the subject
matter of this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption-

II 17/04
5-P7-

Date:
Time:

Signar :^ofMother

CERTTFICATION

i.

Rurlu

A /Qckktr

, hereby declare that:

1. I am a representative of LDS Social Services, a licensed child-placing agency, and I have been authorized to
take relinquishments and consents to adoption.
2. 1 certify that, to the best of my information and belief, the person executing the foregoing Relinquishment
and Consent to Adoption has read and understands said Relinquishment and Consent and has signed it freely and
voluntarily.
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES

Rv ^ V A / - f
Page 1 of 2
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&M.\

NOTARIZATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
)

COUNTY OF L H ^ i - On the

I4

day of

f\j o

Peruse.

before me

xr^rrO^ar'

_• 19

^ /1;

r

1 4 , personally appeared

. who signed the foregoing document in my

(Birth mother)
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that her signature is voluntary and the document truthful.

sm-.

NICOLE D.MUHLESTEIN

:?i mj&yb ; : ;

1190 NORTH 900 EAST

/ v C 2 5 : < ^ HOTARY PUBLIC-STATE of UTAH
/ : / J K ? / X # LDS SOCIAL SERVICES
7 V^^V//
X

PROVO, UT 846G4

-^:C-/

COMM. EXP, 8-31-98

My Commission Fxpires:

Notary .
Residing at

p •y/ • ; 0

WITNESSES

We,

\/zl Uwph

and

Udd C^ltli

, arc witnesses

to the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption signed by
(Birth mother)
We do each hereby declare as follows:
1. I am not affiliated with LDS Social Services and I am not a member of the birth mother's family.
2. The birth mother has stated that she has read and understands the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent
to Adoption and that the document is truthful
3. To the best of my information and belief, the birth mother signed this document freely and voluntarily.
Date:

/ / / / 7/ f y

Date: J [

InlW

Witness

Revised 9/93
Forms\Consent.FRM

Page 2 of 2
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David M. McConkie (A2154)
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants
Denise Allan and LDS Social Services
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARIO G. BELTRAN,
vs.

:
:
:
:

DENISE
ALLAN;
LDS SOCIAL
SERVICES, an Agency of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and
JOHN DOES I through V,

:
:
:
:

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT
BEKKER

OF

BEVERLY

Case No. 950400021

Judge Guy R. Burningham

:

)
:ss.
)

I, Beverly R. Bekker, hereby depose and affirm under oath as follows:

000033

R.

1. I am a licensed clinical social worker in the employ of LDS Social Services
("Agency"), a licensed child placement agency. I work in the Provo, Utah office of the
Agency.
2. In the latter part of August 1994, I met with Denise Allan in my office.
Denise was expecting a child in November 1994 and requested the assistance of the
Agency in placing her child for adoption. Denise identified Mario G. Beltran, a California
resident, as the father.
3. On October 27, 1994, I sent a certified letter to Mario G. Beltran at his
California address informing Mr. Beltran that Denise was in Utah, that her baby was due
in November 1994, that she intended to place her baby for adoption, and that she had
identified him as a possible father of the child. A true and correct copy of the letter is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4.

On or about November 8, 1994, I received a letter from Mr. Beltran

regarding his filing of a California legal action to establish his paternity of Denise's baby.
A true and correct copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
5. On November 14, 1994, Denise gave birth to a baby girl in a Utah County
hospital.
6. On November 17, 1994, Denise signed a relinquishment and consent to
adoption, transferring custody of her child to the Agency for the purpose of placing the

-2-
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child for adoption. A true and correct copy of this document is attached hereto as Exhibit
C.
7. On November 17, 1994, immediately following Denise's relinquishment, the
Agency placed her baby for adoption with the adoptive parents, with whom the baby has
continuously resided since that date.
8. On November 16, 1994, prior to the relinquishment, the Agency inquired of
the Bureau of Vital Statistics to determine whether an acknowledgment of paternity had
been filed with regard to Denise's baby. No acknowledgment was on file, and a certificate
to that effect was issued. A true and correct copy of that certificate is attached hereto
as Exhibit D.
DATED this£<^_day of September, 1995.

Beverly R. ^Bekker

-3-
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On thiSc^cJ — day of September, 1995, before me, the undersigned notary,
personally appeared BEVERLY R. BEKKER, who signed the preceding document in my
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and the
document truthful.

RANELLET.O'DELL
HOTABYPUBLIC-

^•?y

STATEolUTAH

c/o LOS SOCIAL SERVICES
1190 NORTH 900 EAST
PROVO, UTAH 84504

NOYARY PlffiLIC

Residing at £sif7ri

COMM. EXP. 9-5-97

My Commission Expires:

D-VSWr>ALD5iI\t>=

-4-

UUU036

/£&/

:%)roifou/. ^iwrej
UTAH PROVO AGENCY
1190 North 900 East
Provo. Utah 84604

EXHIBIT A

October 27, 1994

Mr. Mario Beltran
21827 Centorion Way
Sangus, CA 91350 •
Dear Mario:
This letter is to inform you that Denise Allen is being assisted by this agency in making an
adoption plan for her child which is due to be delivered the end of November 1994. She
has named you as a possible father of her unborn child.
Her decision is to place the baby for adoption in a family that can provide stability and a
socially, emotionally safe environment She desires this child to have all the things the child
needs at this time that she is not able to provide.
Thank you for the background information you have already completed. It would be helpful
if you could complete the family history pages and the WAIVER (in duphcate) signed in the
presence of a notary. A self-addressed stamped envelope is enclosed for your convenience.
Sincerely,
*S SENDER:
2

! also

#

wish to receive the

C o m p e t e items 1 and/or 2 for additional- service*.
following services (for an extra
• Cornpleta items 3 . and -ia & b.
J * Pri»"t your rvarr>« and address on rh« nvnrsB of thi* form «o thai w o c a n
fee):
£ return this card to y o u .
1 . • Addressee's Address
> • Attach this form to the front of th« mailpwca. or on the back H apace
2 d o e s not permit.
2. ^ R e s t r i c t e d Delivery
*2 • Write "Return Receipt R e q u e s t e d " on the m*iTpi«ce bekaw tha trticle ncimb-arJ
— • The Return Receipt will show, to w h o m the irricie w a s delivered and the date
Consult postmaster for fee.
C delivered
'
O
w

Beverly K. Bekker,
nm

l
J.
**
T pTTTf
A - A ^ O YY

4a.

3. Article Addressed t o :

Article Number

CO

u

<o

en
c

5

Mr. Mario Beltran
21827 Centorion Way
Sangus, CA 91350

4b. Service Type
• Registered
D
Vcertified
D

>

o
c

Insured

C"

c

D COO

Express
Mail ^ D Return Receipt for
v
Merchandise

7. Date of Delivery

t T S i g n a t u r i e (Addressee)

^

MM iny\

(nrbr^.o-x

8. Addressee's Address (Only if requested
and fee is paid)

6. Signature (Agent)

PS Form 3 8 1 1 , December 1 9 9 1 c U.S.G.P.O.: i«2-307-S30

DOMESTIC

RETURN

RECEIPT

° - ^135

m

MARIO G. B2LT2AN
21227 CSTTURIA2T WAY
SAUGUS, CA 913S0
November 3, 1994

P.31/12

^
EXHlbi S

Beverly a. Backer, LCSW
L D S Social Services
Utah Prove Agency
1190 North 900 East
Provo, Utah 94 604
Dear Ms. Bekkar:
Piaase ha advised that I have filed a Complaint to Establish a
Paternal Relationship requesting custody of our unborn child in the
Superior Court of California; Case No. PFG00505.
I do not intend to give up any of my paternal rights to this child,
and, after blood testing, if the child proves to be nine, I intend
to pursue custody of ay child as vigcursly as possible.
1 an enclosing a copy of the action filed here on October 26, 1994,
and Denise Allen vill be served vith this action as quickly as that
can be arranged.
If you have any questions, please contact iae.
Yours truly,

Mario G. Beltran
MGB/cp
Snclosuras as stared.
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on the

County, State of Utah.

2. Because I feel that it is in this child's best interests to be placed for adoption, I hereby release and relinquish
this child to the care, custody and control of LDS Social Services, for placement for adoption.
3. I fully understand that by signing this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption I am erving up all of my
parental rights to this child, and that my decision to place this child for adoption with LDS Social Services is final and
I cannot change my mind.
4. I consent to the legal adoption of this child by any persons with whom LDS Social Services places this child
for adoption. I understand that LDS Social Services will use its best efforts to place this child with the adoptive parents
I may have selected in consultation with LDS Social Services. I understand and agree that if I have not selected adoptive
parents or if LDS Social Services, in its sole and absolute discretion, decides that this child should be placed with other
adoptive parents or that it is not in the child's best interest for the adoptive parents I have selected to complete the
adoption, LDS Social Services may place this child for adoption with any adoptive parents LDS Social Services selects.
5. I understand and agree that LDS Social Services may, in its sole discretion, release its custody, and control
over thh child to another licensed child placing agency for adoptive placement within said other agency's sole discrction.
6. I waive the right to notice of any and all legal proceedings which may be held in courts of the State of Utah,
or elsewhere, in connection with the adoption of this child.
7. I have read the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption and I fully understand its terms and
conditions. My decision to relinquish this child to LDS Social Services and to consent to the adoption of this child has
been made voluntarily and of my own free will and choice. I am signing this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption
freely and voluntarily, without any coercion, force or duress and without any payment or promise to pay any money or
other thing of value for the purpose of inducing me to place this child for adoption, consent to an adoption, or cooperate
in the completion of an adoption.
8. I agree that this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption shall be executed and interpreted according to the
laws of the State of Utah, and I agree to submit myself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah with regard to the subject
matter of this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption-
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CERTIFICATION
I,

JtLt')m'U
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/Pckk^r

• hereby declare that:

1. I am a representative of LDS Social Services, a licensed child-placing agency, and I have been authorized to
take relinquishments and consents to adoption.
2. I certify that, to the best of my information and belief, the person executing the foregoing Relinquishment
and Consent to Adoption has read and understands said Relinquishment and Consent and has signed it freely and
voluntarily.
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES

;L,i/.J d-M*.

By,

I
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NOTARIZATION'
STATE OF UTAH
:ss
)

COUNTY OF LH<ri~
On the _ J J

day of

f\i o \rtrr^<KX~

19

*»4 , personally appeared

before me

QCTUSe.
^ \ \ \\
. who signed the foregoing document in mv
(Birth mother)
~~~
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that her signature Ls vokStary and the document truthful.
NICOLE D. MUHLESTEIN
HOTARX PUBLIC - STATE ol UTAH

LDS SOCIAL SERVICES
11 SO NORTH 9CO EAST
PROVO, UT 8^604

COMM.EXP.8-31-S5
My Commission Expires:

Notary ftibhc

\AlAnfuA

Residing at

Q ' ;I ' I *

WITNESSES
We,

Vd,l

L/naph <-d>>5

and

TnM &r<l(U

, arc witnesses

to the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption signed by
(Birth mother)
We do each hereby declare as follows:
1. I am not affiliated with LDS Social Services and I am not a member of the birth mother's family.
2. The birth mother has stated that she has read and understands the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent
to Adoption and that the document is truthful.
3. To the best of my information and belief, the birth mother signed this document freely and voluntarily.
Date:

////7 /f ?

Dale: )(

InlW

° Witness

Revised 9/93
Forms\Conscnt.FRM
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EXHIBIT

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

B

CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH
FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY BY FATHER
Name of Mother

Denise Allan
Place of Child's Birth

Date of Child's Birth

Provo, UT

Sex of Child

Nov. 14, 1994

Female

This is to certify that a search has been made of the records of ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF P A T E R N I T Y BY FATHER
filed w i t h the State Office of Vital Statistics and no record was found to be on file.

1:50 pm

?&S£b

Nov. 16, 1994
DATE OF

SEARCH

DIRECTOR

OF HEALTH

STATISTICS

If an Acknowledgment of Paternity by Father h found on file, a certified copy will be issued. If no record is on file, a
C E R T I F I C A T E OF SEARCH is issued.

SDH-BHS-23

9/79
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Name. Accress and Telephone No or^:omsy(s)
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C. Grillo, Esq.
Lyons Avenue, Suite 403
Clarita, California 91321-2534
Bar 92673
259-0527

* *

vv
~

G ^

^
•%
^

r\

'•$•»'*

\J-

Attorney(s) for WAR 10.. G„.. BELTRAN,
Plaintiff
-p-*

COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTS OF .L0.S. .ANGELES
(SUPERIOR, MUNICIPAL, or JUSTICE)

rORTH VALLEY.DISTRICT
(Name af Municipal or Justice Court Distnct or of orancn court, if any!

CASENUM8ER

Plamtiff(s): M A R I O G. B E L T R A N

PF 0 0 0 5 0 5
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL
CD

TYPE CF ACTION

Oefendants(s): D E N I S E

ALLAN

I

I Personal Injury, Property Damage and Wrongful DeattCTl

I I Motor Vehicle
• Other
rXI Oomestic Relations
I I Eminent Domain
rxi Other: (Specify). C o m p l a i n t . . t.o. E s t a b l i s h
Paternity

(Abbreviated Title)

TO THE CLERK. Please dismiss t h i s a c t i o n as follows: (Check applicable boxes.)
1. •

With prejudice

2. C D Entire action
I

E D Without prejudice
•

Complaint only

•

Petition only

•

Cross-complaint only

I Other: (Specify) 3

LAW OFFICES OF LINDA C. GRILLO
Dated:. J u n e . 16 Jm. 19 9 5
K

lf dismissal reauested is of specified parties onry. of specified
causes of action onry or of speafied cross-camptamts onry. so
state and identify tne parties, causes of action or cross-complaints
to oe dismissed.

Attorney(s) for MARIO G. BELTRAN,

Linda C. G r i l l e

Plaintiff

Esq.

(Type or print attorney(s) name(s))

TO THE CLERK: Consent to the above dismissal is hereby given."

Dated:.. JV??e.22,.19?5

THOMPSON, VHITii, KING & FRENCH

, „ ^

'*wnen a crass-complaint (or Response (Mamage) seeking affirmative relief) is an file, tna attamey(s) for the cross-compiamant
(resconaent) must sign tnis consent when reauireo oy CCP
Sai(i).(2Jar(5).

Attorney(s) for
Mark T

/ -/
DENISE

Petersen,

^

ALLAN/

Defendant

ESCN

(Type or print attorney(s) name(s))

T o be completed by clerk)

*,..(S.:.23S^..

2 $ Oismissai entered as requested or
I Oismissai entered on
as to only
I Dismissal not entered as requested for the following reason(s), and attorney(s) notified on

, Clerk
)ated

V' 5^-3. £}

CI
r/S.VAftVXiY^acx^

,Deputy

ADOPT:O::
through r4) as present Subsections (1>) tr.fji'sr.
(i), respectively, and making related grammatical, stylistic, ana reference changes; addec the
language ceginnmg "witnessed by two mcivicuals" at the end of Subsection (1/b); ar.c m-

73-30-4.3

3e-.ec ":r re r rush men t of a birth mother or
acttr.ee ar.c s-cst.tuted uit shall be signed anc
ct--.rmec ---*.- oath oefore' for "by" in tne
T.troc—tor *r.:rua:re o: present Subsection
n

78-30-4.8. Filing r e q u i r e m e n t s — Children b o r n outside
of marriage.
(1) fa) Any person who is the father or claims tc ce the father of a child born
outside of marriage may file notice cf his claim of paternity and of his
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability with
the state registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health.
(b) The Department of Health shall provide forms for the purpose of
filing the notices of paternity described in this section. Forms shall be
made available by the department, in the office cf the county clerk in each
county, in every hospital, as defined in Subsections 26-21-2(8) and (13),
and in every licensed child placing agency.
(2) The notice may be filed prior to the birth of the child but must be filed
prior to the time the child is relinquished to a licensed child placing agency or
prior to the filing of a petition by a person with whcm the mother has placed
the child for adoption. The notice shall be signed by the person filing and shall
include his name and address, the name and last-known address of the birth
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and year
of the expected birth of the child. The person whc files a notice under this
section shall notify the registrar of vital statistics cf any change of his address.
The Department of Health shall maintain a confidential registry for this
purpose.
(3) The Legislature finds t h a t a certain degree cf finality is necessary in
order to facilitate the state's interest in expediting the adoption of young
children and in protecting the rights and interests of the child, the birth
mother, and the adoptive parents. Therefore, any putative father who fails to
file his notice of paternity is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining
any action to assert any interest in the child unless he proves by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(a) it was not possible for him to nie a notice of paternity within the
period of time specified in Subsection ',2);
(b) his failure to file a notice of paternity was through no fault of his
own; and
(c) he filed a notice of paternity within 10 days after it became possible
for him to file.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 75-30-4. L%4\ failure to file a timely
notice of paternity shall be deemed to be a waiver and surrender of any right
to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for adoption of the child, and
the consent of that person to the adoption cf the child is not required.
(5) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to a child born outside of
marriage, if there is no showing that a putative father has consented to or
waived his rights regarding the proposed adoption, it shall be necessary to file
with the court, prior to its entering a final decree of adoption, a certificate from
the Department of Health, signed by the state registrar of vital statistics,
stating that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from
putative fathers of children born outside of marriage and that no filing has
been found pertaining to the father of the z'nld m question.
i ?Q

(J 0 0 0 4 3

